The protected zone represents a region around a given aircraft that no other aircraft should penetrate for the safety of both aircraft, and defines the minimum separation requirements. In this paper, three major components of the protected zone and their interplays are identified: a vortex region, a safety buffer region, and a state-uncertainty region. A systematic procedure is devised for the analysis of the state-uncertainty region. In particular, models of trajectory controls are developed that can be used to represent different modes of pilot and/or autopilot controls, such as path feedback and non-path feedback. Composite protected zones under various conditions are estimated, and effective ways to reduce sizes of protected zones for advanced air traffic management are examined.
INTRODUCTION
Commercial aircraft must be sufficiently separated from one another in order to ensure safety. In fact, there is a region around each aircraft in flight that no other aircraft should penetrate for the safety of all aircraft. This region is defined in this paper as the protected zone. The protected zone defines minimum separation standards among commercial aircraft and constrains the flow of air traffic.
The current separation standards were determined many years ago, but the method by which separation standards were developed is not well documented. It appears to have been based upon "radar accuracy, display target size, and controller and pilot confidence" [Thompson, 1997] . While there have been some significant efforts on analyzing oceanic separation standards and separation standards for parallel runway operations, domestic separation standards have been by and large unchanged. Advances in technology and operational concepts over the past several decades warrant an investigation into separation requirements.
Significant amount of work has been conducted on conflict alerting and avoidance that assumes certain minimum separation standards , Teo & Tomlin 2003 ]. There has also been extensive work on collision risk modeling [FAA/Eurocontrol 1998 , Blom & Bakker 2002 . These models can calculate probabilities of aircraft collisions under specified flight conditions. Separation requirements may be analyzed indirectly using these models by evaluating the risk levels that certain separation standards introduce into the airspace system. To complement the above works, a formal approach is needed for direct studies of minimum separation standards.
Recently, Reynolds & Hansman [2000] identified factors involved in defining aircraft separation standards and discussed the importance of accurate state information for controllers in maintaining separation standards. The current paper develops a formal approach that properly combines these factors in the analysis of the protected zone and thus minimum separation standards.
Specifically, three distinct components of the protected zone are identified and their interplay analyzed: the vortex region, the safety buffer region, and the stateuncertainty region. A methodology for systematically estimating the state-uncertainty region that accounts for different trajectory control modes is developed. Estimates of the state-uncertainty region are obtained and are then properly combined with those of the vortex region and the safety buffer region to obtain estimates of the entire protected zone. Results of this paper may be used for analyses in conflict detection, conflict resolution, and collision risks.
COMPOSITION OF THE PROTECTED ZONE
In this paper, the protected zone is defined as a region around a given aircraft that, if violated, the safety of either the given aircraft, or an intruding aircraft, or both, could be compromised. It represents a fundamental non-intrusion zone around a given aircraft. The protected zone defines minimum separation standards among aircraft. Its violation is considered to be a conflict.
Let us first assume that the position of an aircraft can be accurately known through surveillance. A basic protected zone would consist of just two regions in this case ( Figure 1 ). The trailing vortices originating from the wing tips of the aircraft create rolling moments, which could potentially overpower the roll control of a following aircraft. Additionally, these same trailing vortices can cause vertical turbulence powerful enough to risk the safety of passengers or even cause damage to a following or a cross trail aircraft [Rossow & James, 2000] . As a result, the vortex region constitutes a part of the protected zone. At the same time, a buffer is needed around the aircraft body that no other aircraft should ever penetrate as a safety protection. This safety buffer region constitutes the other part of the basic protected zone.
In reality, however, inaccuracies of aircraft surveillance create uncertainties in the knowledge of aircraft state information for ground ATC and other aircraft. In order for air traffic controllers and/or other pilots to maintain sufficient inter-aircraft separations, they need to identify a region in which each aircraft is located over a certain time frame. This region is called a state-uncertainty region for a given aircraft. Because each point inside the state-uncertainty region represents a likely aircraft position in actual flight, a basic protected zone discussed above must be reserved for each point in the state-uncertainty region; resulting in a composite protected zone as shown in Figure 2. A related but subtly different concept is called the required action range. In order to ensure that the protected zone is not violated, involved aircraft must start avoidance maneuvers well ahead of the protected zone boundary. This is because aircraft cannot make instantaneous position changes due to performance limitations and pilots/controller reaction times. A required action range represents the smallest relative separation by which proper corrective actions must be taken in order to maintain the minimum separation requirements or to avoid a potential conflict in time. It is difficult to completely separate the definitions of the protected zone and the required action range, since both depend on pilot action times. For the convenience of systematically analyzing effects of various factors on separation requirements, the protected zone is defined to be independent of relative motions and performance limits of aircraft involved in a potential conflict as well as controller reaction times, with the exceptions that the influence of the wake vortex depends on the type of aircraft that follows and the estimation of the protected zone requires the use of an estimated typical pilot maneuver time in avoiding potential conflicts. In comparison, the concept of required action range is defined to depend on relative aircraft motions, aircraft performances, as well as pilot/controller reaction times.
Therefore, there are three related separation requirements. The safety buffer region represents the absolute minimum separation for safety and must be maintained during a close encounter. The protected zone defines the separation requirement that controllers and pilot strive to maintain under normal air traffic control operations. Finally, the required action range reflects the relative range or time at which controllers and/or pilots should start to maneuver correctly in order to respect the protected zones.
Once the protected zone is defined, a required action range can be determined. In Kuo & Zhao [2001] a systematic procedure for theoretically determining least required action ranges is presented based on optimal control theory. To determine practical required action ranges for the current ATC system, on the other hand, many factors must be considered that include relative aircraft geometry, aircraft performance limits, radar sweep times, controller reaction times, communication times, and pilot response times. The focus of this paper is on the analysis of the protected zone. The study of required action ranges will be considered in future works.
MODELING OF COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT FLIGHT
In order to estimate state-uncertainty regions, models of aircraft dynamics, potential error sources, and trajectory controls are needed.
Aircraft Equations of Motion
For a first-order analysis of the protected zone, a point-mass aircraft model is adequate. With the assumption of flat earth and coordinated turns, a set of three-dimensional pointmass equations of motion for a commercial aircraft can be derived as follows.
where V is the true airspeed, T is the normalized excess thrust, L is the normalized lift, g is the acceleration of gravity, γ is the air-relative flight path angle, Ψ is the air-relative heading angle measured clockwise from the North, I
Ψ is the inertial heading angle, φ is the aircraft bank angle, ) , ( y x are the aircraft positions in the (East, North) direction, h is the altitude, ( 
Models of Trajectory Control
Flying aircraft are controlled by pilots or autopilots to follow commanded trajectories. Let us assume that at some time
where the time-dependence allows for full generality in expressing different phases and maneuvers of aircraft flights. The horizontal part of the commanded trajectory can then be constructed from In actual flights, pilots or autopilots may use different modes of trajectory control to follow flight commands in the presence of navigation errors and disturbances. Actual control strategies can be very complicated. In this paper, general models of trajectory controls are developed using the method of feedback linearization [Slotine & Li, 1991] .
A vertical trajectory control model is first derived for an altitude command ) (t h c . The idea of feedback linearization is to derive necessary control functions from a specification of desired closed-loop response dynamics. For example, the normalized lift may be used to control the aircraft altitude, and the resulting trajectory control is of second-order. The desired altitude response dynamics can be stated as 
Substituting this into Eq. (12), the lift control law can be derived as
In Eq. 
where h n and h n are the corresponding navigation/estimation errors.
The general vertical trajectory control model in Eq. (13) can be used to describe either a path feedback control or a non-path feedback control. . This control law corresponds to a path feedback control. On the other hand, if an altitude rate (climb rate, descent rate, flight path angle, etc) is specified then
. This corresponds to a non-path feedback strategy. In addition, the feedback coefficients can be selected as
where the damping ratio V ζ and the natural frequency V ω can be selected to match typical response characteristics of a human pilot or an autopilot [Warren, 1999] . 
, and neglecting lateral wind measurement errors, the lateral trajectory control model can be approximated as η φŝin
When
, this lateral trajectory control law describes a non-path feedback control mode. Otherwise, it describes a path-feedback control mode. The differences between human pilots and autopilots can again be described by the use of different feedback control coefficients.
Following the same procedure and approximations, the longitudinal trajectory control can be modeled by . The longitudinal position control may be used continuously or periodically.
In the above, the lift control in Eq. (13) corresponds to the "path-on-elevator" control mode whereas Eq. (20) reflects the "speed-on-throttle" control mode. Other control modes can be modeled similarly. Details are omitted.
NOMINAL SURVEILLANCE TRAJECTORIES
External observers determine the state information of a given aircraft through surveillance. A typical surveillance system operates periodically every S T sec. For example, 12 = S T sec for en route radars. Mathematically, the surveilled aircraft state may be expressed as
(24) is the horizontal position determination error. Short-term intents may be expressed in the form of constant horizontal acceleration components and vertical rate.
In general, flight intents may be expressed in a wide variety of forms. Correct determination of an aircraft's flight intent is crucial to accurately estimating its future flight paths. In the current ATC system intent is typically known through pre-filed flight plans and mandatory compliance with controller commands. In the proposed Free Flight environment or a failure condition, a situation could arise where the intent is unclear. However, incorporating intent errors into the construction of the protected zone can drastically increase its dimensions, since the lack of knowledge of intent magnifies the state-uncertainty region. For the efficiency of airspace operations, the protected zone should be defined under most likely conditions. In this paper, the intent errors ) , , (
are assumed to be very small, and the protected zone is defined with known intents. Possible intent errors can be considered in devising strategies for conflict detection and avoidance .
Based on surveilled state information of a target aircraft, a nominal surveillance trajectory can be constructed as an estimate of likely future positions of the target aircraft over a certain time period
where n x W , and n y W , are wind components estimated by the surveillance system. They are assumed constant and equal to the estimated wind components used onboard aircraft:
In the case of 0 = Ψ n 4 , the horizontal trajectories become
For estimating nominal surveillance trajectories over a long term such as for oceanic flights, the acceleration intents and the estimated wind components can vary with time. Numerical integrations can be used to obtain nominal surveillance trajectories.
A PROCEDURE FOR ESTIMATING THE STATE-UNCERTAINTY REGION
The state-uncertainty region is defined as the contour that contains largest likely deviations of actual aircraft trajectories
Expressions of Trajectory Deviations
as the along-track and cross-track deviations of actual trajectories from nominal surveillance trajectories respectively. At a given point in time, these deviations are defined relative to the current nominal heading ) (t n Ψ
. Similarly as for Eqs. (16) and (17), one has
where ) (t h c ∆ reflects deviations of actual aircraft altitudes from commanded altitudes.
With the assumption of negligible intent estimation errors, the differences between actual aircraft trajectories and nominal surveillance trajectories may be decomposed into three components (Figure 4 For the convenience of discussions in this paper, these combinations will be referred to as the total onboard system errors.
Monte Carlo Simulations
Eqs. (1) through (21) constitute a complete set of equations. This set can be numerically integrated forward repeatedly in Monte Carlo simulations [Kuchar 1996 ] to study differences between actual aircraft trajectories and nominal surveillance trajectories over a certain time period.
In the Monte Carlo simulations, modeling errors, wind measurement errors, and navigation errors are all assumed to be independent, white noise random processes. In reality, these random processes may not be white. For the purpose of estimating trajectory deviations, these assumptions are reasonable. In addition, all random processes are assumed to follow uniform distributions, since they represent the worse case within specified ranges. In actual flights, random variables may not be of uniform distributions. The use of different probabilistic distributions affects the size of the estimated stateuncertainty regions somewhat, but does not fundamentally change the basic characteristics of the region. The uniform probability density function for a generic random variable z over a specified range is given by 
where z is the mean value. In the following examples, zero means are assumed.
Finally for good numerical accuracies in simulation studies, all state variables are normalized as follows:
Details are omitted.
Choice of the Final Time
An appropriate choice of the final time should be the larger one of the surveillance interval S T and some typical maneuver time M T needed for conflict avoidance. Whenever a new surveillance measurement is made on a target, a different nominal surveillance trajectory for this aircraft can be defined, resulting in a different state-uncertainty region. On the other hand, another aircraft that is trying to avoid this aircraft may not be able to change its maneuver plans easily once it initiates the maneuver and thus would need some stable estimate of the protected zone for the target aircraft. In other words, the state-uncertainty region for the protected zone definition should contain the largest potential differences between actual aircraft positions and the nominal surveillance trajectories during the maneuver time, as illustrated in Figure 5 .
According to the FAA [FAA 1983] , the pilot response time in case of an emergency avoidance is on the order of 5 . 12 =
R T
sec. This is supported by a human operator model by Hess [1987] . A typical maneuver time can therefore be estimated as 40
sec. This time frame is consistent with the alert time used in TCAS [Williamson & Spencer 1989 , Harman 1987 . For oceanic flights, on the other hand, M S T T > and the surveillance interval S T should be used for estimating the stateuncertainty region.
Estimating the State-Uncertainty Contour
To estimate the contour of the state-uncertainty region from simulation results, a cylinder with the smallest volume that contains all the simulated data points may be found. For example, the vertical dimension of the contour can be determined from
where N is the total number of simulated data points, and
is the largest vertical deviation during the kth simulation,
Assume the horizontal shape of the state-uncertainty contour to be an ellipse, its horizontal dimensions may be determined from the following optimization problem 
Assuming A B β = and for a given β , the optimal A can be found as
Note that when 1 = β
, it corresponds to a circle. A few different values of β may then be taken and the one that offers the smallest 2 A AB β = can be selected. In this paper, 1 = β is used.
Alternative to finding the region of smallest volume containing all worse-case position deviations, one may define contours representing a certain percentile of the worst-case deviations, such as 95-percentile. The procedure would be very similar.
A Special Solution
In the case of constant heading flights with small heading angle measurement errors, a simplified solution can be found. Eqs. (16) and (17) 
Substituting these relations into Eqs. (33) and (34), we obtain
After some algebra, it can be shown that , whereas the largest likely surveillance errors can just be directly added to the maximum total onboard system errors to obtain estimates of the state-uncertainty region. This assumption reduces the number of independent random variables in the Monte Carlo simulations as well as the number of necessary simulations to obtain accurate estimates of largest likely deviations. Because n c Ψ ≈ Ψ is basically true when flight intents are correctly known, this special approach is used below.
MAXIMUM TOTAL ONBOARD SYSTEM ERRORS
In the extensive simulations, Simulink is used to generate random numbers at each integration step, and the fourth-order Runge-Kutta numerical integration method in Matlab is used to numerically integrate the differential equations forward. To avoid numerical difficulties of integrating stochastic differential equations, values of the random processes are sampled once and held constant for each integration step. At the end of each simulation, the greatest deviations of aircraft positions from commanded trajectories during the interval ] , 0 [ f t are stored.
In order to determine an appropriate sample size or the number of data points, simulations were run varying the sample size from 1,000 to 15,000 in 1,000 increments. The maximum total onboard system errors tend to become stabilized within a certain range after a sample size of 5,000. In order to be conservative, the sampling size of 15,000 is used for generating the following simulation results.
In the first example, non-path feedback controls in the longitudinal and lateral direction are assumed whereas in the vertical direction, a path feedback control maintaining a commanded altitude is used. In particular, the airspeed control of Eq. (20a) is assumed in the longitudinal direction. A level cruise flight is considered. This example serves as the reference case for the following studies. ft. It is interesting to note that the scatters of the total onboard system errors do not depend on the direction of flight ( Figure 6 ). Figure 7 shows a typical single simulation trajectory with the above random parameters. Note that the maximum deviation of the aircraft position from the commanded trajectory does not necessarily occur at the end of the simulation integration.
Effects of feedback control gains on total onboard system errors are now examined. In this simulation study, the frequency bandwidth of the control loops are increased to 0.1 rad/sec in both horizontal and vertical directions, and the following feedback control gains are used:
. All other random parameters are assumed the same as in the reference case of Figure 6 . The simulation results are summarized in Figure 8 , which shows that tightening the control loops does not affect the horizontal contour of the total onboard system errors significantly in the case of non-path horizontal trajectory control.
The above simulations are repeated now with the use of path feedback in the longitudinal and lateral directions. For the nominal case of path feedback control, the following feedback control gains are used: . These correspond to a damping ratio of 0.5 and a response bandwidth of 0.05 rad/sec in both horizontal and vertical directions. All other random parameters are assumed the same as in the reference case of Figure 6 . A comparison of path and non-path feedback controls is shown in Figure 9 . Figure 10 shows changes in total system errors when the response bandwidth is increased to 0.1 rad/sec, or the feedback control gains become:
, and 01 .
. Tighter feedback controls lead to smaller total system errors when the path feedback control mode is used.
The maximum total system errors also depend on the choice of the final time for the numerical integration. If the non-path feedback control model is used in the longitudinal and lateral directions, along-track and lateral trajectory deviations of actual flight from commanded trajectories grow as the final time of integration increases. The vertical deviations tend to become stabilized within a range, due to the use of path feedback control in the vertical direction. When the path feedback control model is used in the horizontal direction, the total system error contour is not very sensitive to the choice of the final time. Path feedback control modes are clearly better than non-path feedback modes in terms of maintaining small total onboard system errors. On the other hand, these modes may introduce additional pilot workload. The use of path feedback control in the longitudinal direction may require regular throttle motion and thus consume more fuel.
Simulation studies were also carried out to examine effects of distributions and magnitudes of various random errors, and the effects of aircraft maneuvers on the total system error contours. Wind measurement errors seem to play a significant role. The basic structure of the total system error contour remains the same under the assumption of zero intent errors. Details are omitted.
Using the contour estimation method discussed above, we obtain 390 max = ξ ft, 390 max = η ft, and 60 max , = ∆ c h ft for the reference case in Figure 6 of horizontal non-path trajectory feedback control and vertical path feedback control.
ESTIMATION OF THE PROTECTED ZONE
To put together an actual estimate for the protected zone, estimates for the stateuncertainty region, the safety buffer, and the vortex region are needed.
The Safety Buffer Region
In this paper, a cylinder centered at the aircraft center of gravity is defined as the safety buffer region. The radius of the cylinder needs to be at least larger than half of the aircraft length plus some safe distance, and the height needs to be larger than the height of the aircraft plus some distance. For the purpose of obtaining a notion of the protected zone, a safety buffer region of 0.1 nm (600 ft) in radius and 200 ft in thickness is used [ Figure  11 ]. This would accommodate a B747 that has a length of 232 ft, a wing span of b= 194 ft, and a thickness of 64 ft.
The Vortex Region
In Rossow and James [2000] , the vortex region is estimated to be a "200 mile long tube of the atmosphere that begins at about one wing span in diameter and increases linearly with distance to about 20 wing spans in diameter." In actual flight conditions, intensities of the trailing vortices become sufficiently weak in some distance behind an aircraft. For the purpose of obtaining some notion of the size of the protected zone in the current paper, the along-track dimension of the vortex tube is plotted to 3 nm where the diameter increases 0.1 wingspan per nm, as shown in Figure 11 . Strictly speaking, different separation requirements are needed for different pairs of aircraft. For example, 4 and 5nm wake separation are required for en route aircraft passing behind large or heavy aircraft.
The trailing vortices drop down in altitude anywhere from 500 to 1,500 feet below the generating aircraft. A definitive study on the descent distance has not been made, and adequate measurements are not available either. In the current paper, the vortex tube is assumed to drop in altitude by a ratio of 1/50 over the backward horizontal distance during the first 12 nm, which is when the long-wave instability occurs, and then the wake does not descend any further afterwards 1 .
The above estimates do not consider the effects of winds and temperature on the vortex region [Rossow, 2002] . Nor do they consider the dynamics of the vortex region when the aircraft is turning. Strictly speaking, dimensions of the wake vortex region not only depend on the characteristics of the generating aircraft, but also on those of the trailing aircraft as well as ambient atmospheric conditions. It is still a challenge to properly incorporate wake vortices into the estimation of the protected zone and additional work is needed.
Estimation of the State-Uncertainty Region
Consider first the mechanical radar in use by air traffic control. The range estimation by radar is quite accurate. But, the error in azimuth can be significant. The resulting error region would then be an ellipse with a major axis perpendicular to the line of sight to the radar. In practical implementation it is most convenient to assume a spherically shaped error region with the major axis as the diameter. The worst-case uncertainty in horizontal position measurement for mechanical radar is assumed to be 5 . 0 max , = ∆ S R nm [Hochwarth, 2002] . For the altitude measurement air traffic control uses Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR). Assuming a Mode C transponder, the altitude quantization error is about 100 feet. It is assumed here that rad. Combining surveillance errors and total onboard system errors, an estimate of the state-uncertainty region with the use of mechanical radar is given as a disk shaped region with a radius of 1.0 nm and a depth of 420 ft as shown in Figure 12 (a) GPS receivers are now used onboard aircraft to provide accurate aircraft state measurements, and these measurements may be broadcast to the ground and other aircraft in the concept of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) [RTCA, 1998] . Surveillance accuracy would then depend on the onboard GPS system accuracy, and the frequency as well as effective number of digits in the broadcast. For the purpose of comparison, the following error ranges are assumed for the use of GPS-based ADS-B system for position and velocity measurements: rad [Misra & Enge, 2001] . Again combining various error sources, an estimate of the state-uncertainty region with the use of GPSbased ADS-B concept is given as a disk shaped region with a radius of 0.075 nm and a depth of 270 ft, as shown in Figure 12 (b) . This is significantly smaller than the stateuncertainty region assuming conventional ground radar. Figure 13 shows the top views of the basic protected zone, the protected zone based on ground ATC radar surveillance, and the protected zone by assuming ADS-B with GPS navigation, whereas Figure 14 compares the side views of the three types of protected zones. The demonstrated dependence of the protected zone on surveillance accuracy is highly consistent with the discussions in Reynolds & Hansman [2000] , and with the current FAA practice, in which the required horizontal separation is 5 nm for controlled aircraft more than 40 nm from the radar site and 3 nm over the terminal area. In particular, the estimated protected zone in Figures 13(b) and 14(b) for the use of conventional radar basically agrees with the current FAA en route separation standards of 5 nm horizontally and 1,000 ft vertically [FAA, 2003] .
Example Estimates of the Protected Zone
These examples are only used to provide an idea of what the protected zone would look like. They should not be taken as hard numbers, as different assumptions on the magnitudes and distributions of the various random processes and pilot response characteristics will surely change the sizes of the protected zones. On the other hand, these examples do illustrate the application of the proposed formal procedure for the analysis of the protected zones. The proposed formal analysis procedure can be used to study protected zones and thus derive separation requirements for a wide range of traffic scenarios. Further refinement of the protected zone analysis can be made by using rigidbody aircraft models in conjunction with the analysis procedure developed here.
Reduction of the Protected Zone
In current ATC practice, the protected zone is a standard for all aircraft and aircraft geometries with the possible exceptions of aircraft takeoffs and landings. Working within the realm of the current ATC system, the protected zone can most likely be reduced through improved surveillance accuracy. If the position of an aircraft is known to a greater degree of certainty, the state-uncertainty region will be smaller. This is the same conclusion arrived at by Reynolds and Hansman [2000] .
If the surveillance errors can be made small enough and become comparable to the total onboard system errors, reduction of the total onboard system errors can further reduce the protected zone. This may be achieved by using path feedback control modes and/or obtaining more accurate onboard measurements of wind components and aircraft states.
Furthermore, the protected zone for each aircraft and pilot can be unique. As shown in this paper, the definition of the protected zone depends upon the dynamics of the aircraft and the characteristics of the pilot. The effective dimensions of the vortex region would also depend upon the relative characteristics of the aircraft behind a given aircraft. For example, a heavy aircraft can follow a light aircraft at a closer distance than a light aircraft can follow a heavy aircraft due to the differing capacities of roll control. Therefore, further reductions of minimum separation requirements may be achieved through individually designed and/or dynamically-varying protected zones.
CONCLUSIONS
A formal method for evaluating the protected zone is presented. The protected zone is defined as a region around a given aircraft that, it violated, would cause danger to either the own aircraft, or the intruder aircraft, or both. It is related to but different from the required action range, which is the least relative separation between two aircraft at which correct avoidance maneuvers must be initiated to prevent the violation of the protected zone.
Three distinct components of the protected zone are identified as the vortex region, the safety buffer region, and the state-uncertainty region. The safety buffer region and the vortex region are essentially added to one another. These two regions must then be considered at all locations in the state-uncertainty region. In this paper, a systematic procedure is presented for the analysis of the state-uncertainty region, which is defined as the contour of likely worse-case deviations of actual trajectories from nominal surveillance trajectories over a certain period of time. These deviations can be decomposed into position surveillance errors, propagation of velocity surveillance errors, and total onboard system errors consisting of flight technical errors and navigation system errors. A Monte Carlo simulation approach is developed to estimate deviations of actual aircraft positions from either commanded or nominal surveillance trajectories. It is found that path feedback modes of trajectory control result in smaller total onboard system errors than non-path feedback modes.
The composite protected zones for various parameter scenarios are presented. Shrinking surveillance uncertainties is found to be central in reducing the size of the protected zone. After the surveillance errors become sufficiently small, reduction of total onboard system errors becomes important for the reduction of the protected zone.
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